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Corporate control covers all controlling right including property and 
operation right except residual claims. Allocation of corporate control is one of 
the core points of corporate governance. It plays a key role in the corporate 
governance, the results of operation and the corporate value. There must be an 
optimal model of corporate control. The paper discusses the effect on the 
operation result and market value by the allocation of corporate control. It 
analyzes detailedly the outcome of the corporate control dispute which took 
place after merger & restructuring between Fujian Motor Group and Xiamen 
Motor Company. The paper notices that the non-market intervention from 
government and unreasonable allocation of corporate control resulted in 
negative effect on the operation performance and market value. The paper 
comes to the conclusion that the optimal allocation model is one shareholder 
holds relatively big share in the context of the fiece internal power struggle in 
Chinese companies. Finally, it proposes the relatively comprehensive solution 
for allocation of corporate control and strategy of capital operation.  
The paper includes five chapters; their brief introduction is as follows: 
Chapter 1: Literature review. The chapter reviews the researches of the 
definition of corporate control, allocation model and its relationship with 
corporate value. It also discusses the optimal allocation model of corporate 
control for Chinese companies. 
Chapter 2: Brief introduction of the object selection. The chapter introduces 
Xiamen Motor’s background, operation result, main subsidiaries, ownership, the 
board of directors and so on.  
Chapter 3: Case analysis. The chapter analyzes the process, the reason and 
the outcome of the dispute of Xiamen Motor Corporation by case study and the 
related theories of corporate control. It probes into the effect on the operation 
result and market value by allocation model of corporate control. 













capital operation. The chapter proposes the relatively comprehensive solution 
for allocation of corporate control and strategy of capital operation to Xiamen 
Motor according to the situation after the dispute of corporate control.  
Chapter 5: Conclusion. The chapter states the findings, limits of the 
research and the future research direction. 
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第一章  文献回顾及简要评论 





















                                                        
① “这些问题主要是分散投资者的集体行为问题及公司各种相关利益群体之间的利益冲突问题等，公
司治理主要就是解决、调和这些问题。” 参见Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Alisa Roell, Corporate 















































































                                                        









































                                                        
① 参见周军：“公司治理比较—基于所有权结构、控制权分配的分析”，《新疆财经》，2002年，第 3
期，P40。 
② Jensen, M. and R. Ruback, 1983, The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence, Journal of 
Financial Economics［J］ 11, P587. 
③ 见周其仁：“控制权回报和企业家控制的企业”，《经济研究》，1997年，P31-42。 
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